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IS THE BANKRUPTCY CODE AN ADEQUATE
MECHANISM FOR RESOLVING THE DISTRESS OF
SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT INSTITUTIONS?
Edward R. Morrison*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The President' and members of Congress 2 are considering proposals that would
give the government broad authority to rescue financial institutions whose failure might
threaten market stability. These systemically important institutions include bank and
insurance holding companies, investment banks, and other "large, highly leveraged,
and interconnected" entities that are not currently subject to federal resolution
authority. 3 Interest in these proposals stems from the credit crisis, particularly the
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. That bankruptcy, according to some observers,4
caused massive destabilization in credit markets for two reasons. First, market
participants were surprised that the government would permit a massive market player
to undergo a costly Chapter 11 proceeding. A very different policy had been applied to
other systemically important institutions such as Bear Steams, Fannie Mae, and Freddie
Mac. Second, the bankruptcy filing triggered fire sales of Lehman assets. Fire sales
were harmful to other non-distressed institutions that held similar assets, which
suddenly plummeted in value. They were also harmful to any institution holding
Lehman's commercial paper, which functioned as a store of value for entities such as

* Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. I thank Franklin Edwards, Jeffrey Gordon, Harold Novikoff, and
participants at the 2009 Temple Law Review Symposium for very helpful comments and conversations.
Nathan Rehn (Columbia JD 2009) provided excellent research assistance.
1. See generally DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: A NEW FOUNDATION

(2009), available at http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/regs/FinalReport

web.pdf [hereinafter FINANCIAL

REGULATORY REFORM] (outlining Obama administration's proposed reforms that would give government
more authority to regulate financial institutions through risk evaluation and monitoring); cf DEP'T OF THE
TREASURY, DivisIoN D-IMPROVEMENTS

FOR FINANCIAL CRISIS MANAGEMENT,

TITLE XII-ENHANCED

RESOLUTION AUTHORITY (proposed 2009), available at http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/regulatory

reform/title-XIIresolution-authority_072309.pdf [hereinafter DIVISION D] (providing for emergency
assistance from Department of Treasury to failing corporations).
2. Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 4173, 111th Cong., available at
http://financialservices.house.gov/Keylssues/FinancialRegulatoryReform/FinancialRegulatoryReform/hr41
73eh.pdf; Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2009, 111th Cong. (discussion draft), http:/Ibanking
.senate.gov/public/ files/AY009D44_xml.pdf
3. FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM, supranote 1, at 23.
4. E.g., Regulating and Resolving Institutions Considered "Too Big to Fail": Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Banking, Housing, & Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 12-13 (2009) (statement of Sheila C. Bair,

Chairman, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation), http://banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=
Files.View&FileStore id-4deb I7aa-b8b8-4bcl -82ef-4c57388acf90.
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the Primary Reserve Fund.5 Fire sales destroyed Lehman's ability to honor these
claims.
Lehman's experience and the various bailouts (of AIG, Bear Steams, and other
distressed institutions) have produced two kinds of policy proposals. One calls for
wholesale reform, including creation of a systemic risk regulator with authority to seize
and stabilize systemically important institutions. Another is more modest and calls for
targeted amendments to the Bankruptcy Code and greater government monitoring of
market risks.6 This approach would retain bankruptcy as the principal mechanism for
resolving distress at non-bank institutions, systemically important or not.7
Put differently, current debates hinge on one question: is the Bankruptcy Code an
adequate mechanism for resolving the distress of systemically important institutions?
One view says "no," and advances wholesale reform. Another view says "yes, with
some adjustments." This Essay evaluates these competing views: Section II discusses
the current structure of the Bankruptcy Code and its limited ability to protect markets
from failing systemically important institutions. Section III outlines policy responses.
In Section IV, I conclude that the Code is indeed inadequate for dealing with failures of
systemically important institutions. A systemic risk regulator is needed because a
judicially administered process cannot move with sufficient speed and expertise in
response to rapidly changing economic conditions.
II.

THE CURRENT BANKRUPTCY-BASED APPROACH

The Bankruptcy Code has, since its enactment, taken steps to mitigate systemic
risk.8 This is the risk that one debtor's failure will infect other financial market
participants, causing a chain reaction of insolvencies that destabilizes markets. The
Code attempts to mitigate this risk through "safe harbors" for swaps, repos, and other
financial contracts. When a debtor enters bankruptcy, non-debtor counterparties can
terminate these contracts, exercise netting and setoff rights, and seize margin to the
extent of the debtor's net obligations to the counterparties.9 These safe harbors allow

5. See,

e.g.,

Christopher Condon,

Reserve

Primary Money

Fund Falls Below

$1 a Share,

BLOOMBERG.COM, Sept. 16, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=a5O2ylgo
IGRU (reporting Reserve Primary Fund's historic loss resulting from Lehman's devalued commercial paper).
6. Consumer Protection and Regulatory Enhancement Act, H.R. 3310, 111th Cong. (2009), available at
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=hl 11-3310; REPUBLICAN MEMBERS OF THE H. COMM. ON
FIN. SERVS., IllTH CONG., FINANCIAL SERVICES COMMITTEE REPUBLICAN PLAN FOR REFORMING THE

FINANCIAL REGULATORY SYSTEM (2009), http://republicans.financialservices.house.gov/images/stories/fscre
pregreformplan.pdf.
7. See infra Sections 11and III for a discussion of the current bankruptcy-based approach and other nonbankruptcy approaches.
8. See generally Franklin R. Edwards & Edward R. Morrison, Derivatives and the Bankruptcy Code:

Why the Special Treatment?, 22 YALE

1. ON REG.

91 (2005) (discussing how exemptions afforded to financial

contracts under the Bankruptcy Code are meant to prevent systemic risk); Edward R. Morrison & Joerg Riegel,
Financial Contracts and the New Bankruptcy Code: Insulating Markets from Bankrupt Debtors and
Bankruptcy Judges, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 641 (2005) (same, but emphasizing 2005 reforms that
expanded the exemptions).
9. Morrison & Riegel, supra note 8, at 645.
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counterparties to extricate themselves quickly from contracts with a failing debtor and
thereby minimize their exposure to its distress.10
These provisions, however, are largely prophylactic: they aim to reduce the risk of
systemic failure, not to manage a clear and present danger of a market meltdown. That
danger exists when a major institution collapses. With or without the Code's safe
harbors, the institution's failure will destabilize markets. Its failure infects financial
markets through three channels. First, and most obviously, the institution will suspend
payments on commercial paper and other debt instruments. This can have profound
effects on financial markets because, when an institution is very large, its debt
instruments are widely held. This was true of Lehman Brothers. After its failure, we
saw important funds "break the buck," producing losses for investors or fund
sponsors." Additionally, major market players may have sold credit default swaps
("CDS") to holders of a failing institution's debt.12 As the institution fails, payments
under these CDS could destabilize the protection sellers, assuming they have not fully
hedged their positions.
Second, the Code's safe harbors permit premature liquidation of failing
institutions.' 3 Non-debtor counterparties rush to terminate existing contracts,
dismembering the failing institution and preventing an orderly wind-down that might
yield greater overall value to counterparties. As these counterparties suffer significant
losses, they too may encounter financial distress. When Lehman Brothers entered
bankruptcy in September 2008, it was party to about 1.5 million transactions with over
8,000 counterparties.1 4 Within two weeks, eighty percent of those transactions had been
terminated, netted, and liquidated.' 5 Significant value was lost, some critics allege,
because no party-Lehman, a trustee, or a judge-could implement an orderly winddown process.' 6
10. Id. at 642; Edwards & Morrison, supra note 8, at 97-98.
11. These funds include the Reserve Primary Fund (the oldest money market fund) and BNY Mellon
Institutional Cash Reserves (a securities lending fund). See Condon, supra note 5 (reporting that Reserve
Primary Fund dropped below one dollar per share); Matthew Keenan & Christopher Condon, BNY Mellon,
Reserve Primary Rattle Fund Investors, BLOOMBERG.COM, Sept. 18, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/

news?pid=20601087&sid=aLCm3FmG9zX4 (reporting that BNY Mellon's Institutional Cash Reserves fell
below one dollar per share).
12. See Serena Ng et al., Lehman Swap Payments Look Bigger than Expected, WALL ST. J., Oct. 11,

2008, at B2 (reporting $400 billion in credit-default swaps made on Lehman Brother's debt after it filed for
bankruptcy).
13. Edwards & Morrison, supra note 8, at 94, 101.
14. Linda Sandler, Lehman Liquidation Cost May Swell

$200 Million as 480 Are Hired,

BLOOMBERG.COM, Oct. 30, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aUWNysWfY
Z Y&refer-home.
I5. Jeffrey McCracken, Lehman's Chaotic Bankruptcy Filing Destroyed Billions in Value, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 29, 2008, at Al0; see also Video: Harvey Miller Speaking at Columbia Law School's Sixth Annual Deals
Roundtable (Columbia Law School 2008), http://www.law.columbia.edu/media inquiries/newsevents/2008/
November2008/dealsround (discussing huge losses resulting from bankruptcy laws' lack of protection for
financial institutions and their clients).
16. E.g., McCracken, supra note 15 (reporting that Lehman Brother's internal analysts estimated as
much as $75 billion of Lehman's value destroyed by chaotic bankruptcy filing). Also, the close-outs occurred
in a market that was weakened as a result of Lehman's failure and had huge price swings in CDS for names
like GMAC, AIG, Morgan Stanley, and Goldman Sachs. See, e.g., Morgan Stanley's CDS Lead Credit
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Third, and perhaps most important, rushed liquidation of a failed institution will
be accompanied by large-scale efforts to sell off margin and rehedge positions by nondebtor counterparties.'7 A counterparty will enter financial contracts with a financial
institution in order to hedge other risky investments on the counterparty's balance
sheet. The financial contract will often be collateralized: the parties will periodically
pledge liquid securities ("margin") to collateralize their expected obligations to each
other. When an institution fails, counterparties will net their outstanding contracts with
the institution and seize margin to the extent that the institution is a net obligor. As
margin is sold en masse, the price of the underlying collateral falls. Because the
underlying collateral is typically composed of liquid securities that function as
collateral for many market players, these players will see their assets decline in value.
Additionally, as counterparties attempt to rehedge simultaneously, the price of hedging
will rise precipitously, creating additional losses for the counterparties. Fear of these
effects prompted the Federal Reserve to orchestrate a bailout of Long Term Capital
Management ("LTCM") in fall 1998.18 Some critics believe that Lehman's bankruptcy
similarly contributed to the subsequent freezing of credit markets.' 9
The failure of a systemically important institution will, therefore, destabilize
markets regardless of whether the Bankruptcy Code offers safe harbors for financial
contracts. Indeed, these safe harbors may exacerbate the instability by permitting a
counterparty "run" on the failing institution.
The government's response, thus far, has been to bail out institutions before they
fail (AIG, Bear Steams) or perform triage afterward (Lehman). 20 The government's
ability to respond has, according to some officials, been hamstrung by legal constraints.
Indeed, one view of Lehman's bankruptcy is that the government was powerless to
prevent it. The Federal Reserve can make loans, as it did to Bear Steams and AIG, if
the borrower posts sufficient collateral. 21 Lehman, however, was highly insolvent and
lacked adequate collateral, according to government officials, 22 which rendered it
Spreads Wider, REUTERS, Oct. 10, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/rbssFinancialServicesAndRealEstate
News/idUSNI036473720081010 (reporting that credit markets weakened in anticipation of credit-default
swaps on Lehman's debt, affecting firms such as Morgan Stanley).
17. See Edwards & Morrison, supra note 8, at 99-106 (recounting circumstances surrounding rushed
liquidation of LTCM).
18. Id. at 100.
19. See, e.g., Carrick Mollenkamp et al., Lehman's Demise Triggered Cash Crunch Around Globe;
Decision to Let Firm Fail Marked a Turning Point in Crisis, WALL ST. J., Sept. 29, 2008, at Al (reporting that

Lehman Brother's collapse sent credit markets into disarray).
20. See, e.g., Ben S. Bemanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Sys., Speech at the Greater Austin Chamber of
Commerce: Federal Reserve Policies in the Financial Crisis (Dec. 1, 2008), http://www.federalreserve.gov/
newsevents/speech/bemanke2008l2Ola.htm (discussing Federal Reserve strategy for dealing with financial
crisis, including policy for helping failing institutions); Michael D. Bordo, An Historical Perspective on the
Crisis of 2007-2008, at 3-4 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14569, 2008), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/wl4569.pdf (discussing Federal Reserve's decisions to bail out Bear Steams and
allow Lehman Brothers to fail).
21. David Small & James Clouse, The Limits the Federal Reserve Act Places on the Monetary Policy
Actions ofthe Federal Reserve, 19 ANN. REv. BANKING L. 553, 560-65 (2000).
22. See, e.g., Confirmation of Mr. Timothy F Geithner to Be Secretary of the U.S. Department of

Treasury, 11Ith Cong. 82-83 (2009) (statement of Timothy Geithner, Treasury Secretary Nominee, answering
questions from Sen. Snowe) (explaining govemment's attempt to avoid Lehman's default once it was evident
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ineligible for assistance. This account has been questioned, 23 but has helped fuel
proposals that would give the government broad authority to address the limits of
bankruptcy law.
III. NON-BANKRUPTCY OPTIONS
Congress and regulators are now considering two options: enact insolvency
legislation for non-bank institutions or modify Chapter 11 to accommodate these
institutions. The former is favored by President Obama; 24 the latter by Republicans in
the House of Representatives. 25
A.

Insolvency Legislationfor Non-Banks

Under this approach, the federal government would have power to seize
systemically important institutions and dictate their futures-reorganization, sale, or
liquidation-in order to minimize effects on financial markets and costs to taxpayers. 26
These institutions might be barred from filing a bankruptcy petition, or the government
might be given the right to intervene in a bankruptcy case, stripping the court of
jurisdiction. 27
To be effective, this approach to systemic risk should have three elements: (i) a
clear definition of "systemically important institutions," (ii) transparent procedures for
rescuing these institutions, and (iii) a broad regulatory framework that guides the
relevant federal agency and the financial institutions before the institutions
hemorrhage.
1.

Definitions

A "systemically important institution" would likely be one that (i) falls within a
category of institutions that have an important presence in financial markets and (ii)
whose failure would threaten market stability. Category (i) almost surely includes any
institution subject to prudential regulation, including investment banks, money market
funds, and mutual funds. Although hedge funds currently sit outside the scope of most

that firm could not fund itself); Joe Nocera & Edmund L. Andrews, Running a Step Behind as a Crisis Raged,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2008, at Al (reporting that Federal Reserve could not bail out Lehman because it did not
have enough assets to serve as collateral); Bernanke, supra note 20 (arguing that Lehman's failure was
unavoidable, given firm's lack of collateral and legal restraints upon Federal Reserve).
23. See, e.g., Editorial, Questions for Mr. Geithner, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2008, at A34 (arguing that

Federal Reserve had insufficient information when deciding to let Lehman fail).
24. See generally FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM, supra note I (outlining Obama administration's
proposed reforms, including legislation aimed at failing non-bank financial institutions).
25. See supra note 6 for sources explaining Republican position on regulatory reform.
26. FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM, supra note 1, at 76-79.

27. A similar right of intervention is possessed by the Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC)
in stockbroker liquidations under Chapter 7. See generally II U.S.C. § 742 (2006); Daniel J. Morse, When a
Securities Brokerage Firm Goes Broke: A Primer on the Securities Investment Protection Act of 1970, 25 AM.
BANKR. INST. J. 34 (2006).

44TEMPLE LAW REVIEW

454

[Vol. 82

regulations-a situation that will likely change in the near future 2 -the LTCM bailout
suggests that they too form a class of institutions that is systemically important.
An institution falls within category (ii) if it is sufficiently large, leveraged,
complex, and capitalized by illiquid assets that its failure would destabilize markets. 29
Even if an institution does not achieve a massive scale, it can still be systemically
important if it is behaving similarly to a large number of institutions that are systemic
as part of a "herd." 0
Legislation could establish the types of institutions within category (i). Category
(ii) requires judgment from a regulator, who must decide whether an institution's scale
or comovement with other firms renders it systemically important. That judgment
could be given to the relevant regulator for the industry, or it could be given to a single
decision maker such as the Federal Reserve. If discretion is given to industry
regulators, the benefits are industry-specific expertise and regulatory competition; the
costs are regulatory capture and politically charged exercise of discretion. If discretion
is given to a single regulator, the benefits are greater (but still incomplete) political
insulation and centralized decision making; the cost is a lack of industry-specific
expertise.3 1 These are theoretical cost-benefit tradeoffs; in practice, the comparison is
very muddy, leaving no obvious basis for preferring a single regulator over multiple
regulators.
2.

Rescue Procedures

The relevant agency must be given fairly broad power to wind down, reorganize,
or sell off a distressed institution. Commercial banking law provides a useful template.
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC" or "the Corporation") has
authority to seize control of a commercial bank that is approaching (or has entered)
insolvency 32 or has engaged in conduct signaling fraud or unsound risk management

28. See, e.g., FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM, supra note 1, at 37-38 (proposing that hedge funds be

required to register with SEC and Commodity Futures Trading Commission).
29. Along these lines, the Treasury has proposed three factors that may help identify systemically
important institutions:
*
the impact the firm's failure would have on the financial system and the economy;
*
the firm's combination of size, leverage (including off-balance sheet exposures), and
degree of reliance on short-term funding; and
*
the firm's criticality as a source of credit for households, businesses, and state and local
governments and as a source of liquidity for the financial system.
Id.
30. MARKUS BRUNNERMEIER ET AL., THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF FINANCIAL REGULATION 25-26

(Int'l Ctr. for Monetary & Banking Studies 2009).
31. See Perspectives on Regulation of Systemic Risk in the Financial Services Industry: Hearing Before

the H Comm. on Financial Servs., 11Ith Cong. app. at 163-67 (2009) (testimony of Peter J. Wallison, Arthur
F. Bums Fellow in Financial Policy Studies, American Enterprise Institute), for a discussion on the costs of
centralized decision making.
32. Intervention is necessary, for example, when a bank is "critically undercapitalized," defined as equity
capital representing two percent or less of total assets. 12 U.S.C. § 183lo(b)(1)(E), (c)(3) (2006). If an
institution becomes critically undercapitalized, the FDIC is required to restrict its activities in statutorily
prescribed ways. Id § 183lo(i). The FDIC may appoint a receiver at any time within 90 days. Id. § 183lo(h).
This rule prevents federal regulators from gambling on bank resurrection.
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practices.33 Once it intervenes, the FDIC has broad power to succeed to the institution,
operate it, revoke its charter, remove management, and choose whether to liquidate the
bank or reorganize it.34 The FDIC's decisions are not subject to court oversight or
notice and hearing requirements.35 The FDIC's mandate is to resolve bank insolvencies
in ways that achieve the lowest cost to federal deposit insurance funds.36
Five broad strategies are available:
(1) Purchase and Assumption. The FDIC may transfer the failing bank to a

solvent institution.37 This is a rapidly executed strategy: a bank may be seized on
Friday and its balance sheet transferred to a solvent bank before the opening of
business on Monday.38 To make the transaction attractive to the acquiring bank, the
FDIC may agree to share losses from risky assets or compensate the acquirer if
transferred liabilities exceed the value of assets.39 Of course, this payment often
functions as full insurance for creditors of the failed bank; they may suffer no haircut as
a result of the bank's failure. 40 Critics therefore argue that "purchase and assumption"
transactions can generate excessive costs (borne by the federal deposit insurance funds)
as well as moral hazard (because creditors are insensitive to a bank's riskiness). 41
Strategies analogous to "purchase and assumption" were applied to Bear Stearns and
WaMu, both sold to JPMorgan. 42 In the first case, however, the sale was orchestrated
by the Federal Reserve, not the FDIC.
(2) Bridge Banks and New Banks. The FDIC may capitalize a new bank that

assumes the balance sheet of a failed institution. 43 The new bank may be a temporary
measure (a "bridge bank") that exists only while the FDIC identifies the best resolution
of the failed bank's operations, a process that can take up to two years. Or the new
bank may be a permanent institution-a new bank-whose stock the FDIC will
eventually sell to investors (the stock can be sold to private investors, such as private

33. Id. § 1821(c)(5).
34. Id. § 191(a). See generally JONATHAN R. MACEY ETAL., BANKING LAW AND REGULATION ch. 10 (3d
ed. 2001) (discussing FDIC's broad authority once it intervenes to rescue failing or threatened bank).

35. James Madison Ltd. v. Ludwig, 82 F.3d 1085, 1092-93 (D.C. Cir. 1996). Judicial review is available
for the decision to impose a receivership or conservatorship, but not for subsequent decisions by the federal
agency. Id.
36. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4).
37. Id §§ 1821(d)(2)(G), 1823(c)(2)(A)(iii).
38. For a useful, oft-quoted, but somewhat outdated summary of the process, see Gunter v. Hutcheson,
674 F.2d 862, 865-66 (11th Cir. 1982).
39. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(2), (c)(4); see also FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., RESOLUTIONS HANDBOOK 29-35
(2003), available at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/reshandbook/ (describing FDIC's use of loss purchase
and assumption transactions to transfer assets of failed banks to solvent banks).
40. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 39, at 29.
41. See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 39, at 20-21, for a summary of these critiques.
42. See generally FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP. & JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, PURCHASE AND ASSUMPTION
AGREEMENT: WHOLE BANK (2008), available at http://www fdic.gov/about/freedom/WashingtonMutual_P
andA.pdf; Robin Sidel et al., J.P. Morgan Buys Bear in Fire Sale, as Fed Widens Credit to Avert Crisis,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 17, 2008, at Al; Robin Sidel et al., WaMu Is Seized, Sold Off to J.P. Morgan, in Largest
Failurein US. Banking History, WALL ST. J., Sept. 26, 2008, at Al; Andrew Ross Sorkin & Landon Thomas
Jr., JPMorganActs to Buy Ailing BearStearns at Huge Discount,N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2008, at Al.
43. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(m), (n). See generally FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 39, at 35-40.
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equity firms)." In either case, the FDIC can transfer all or part of a failed institution's
balance sheet. 45 Creditors cannot object but are entitled to recoveries at least as large as
they would receive in a liquidation. 46 Last year, the FDIC chartered a bridge bank to
salvage the operations of Silverton Bank. 47
(3) Receivership and Liquidation. The FDIC can assume the role of receiver,
marshal and liquidate bank assets, pay depositors or transfer their accounts to another
institution, and then distribute the remaining value in the estate to other claimants. 48
The procedure is typically used when no healthy institution is willing to acquire the
failing bank's balance sheet. 49 Critics argue that a version of receivership and
liquidation should have been applied to Lehman to ensure an orderly wind-down.50
(4) Conservatorship and Government Assistance. The federal government has
authority to appoint itself as conservator of a bank-without revoking its charter-and
operate it with a view toward rehabilitation. 5' Until recently, the FDIC rarely employed
this strategy. 52 In mid-2008, the Corporation was designated conservator for IndyMac,
a federal savings bank.53 About two months later, another federal agency-the Federal
Housing Finance Agency ("FHFA")-became conservator for the governmentsponsored entities ("GSEs") Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.54 The Housing and
Economic Recovery Act of 20085s created the FHFA to regulate the GSEs.56 The
44. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(2)(F), (in). If an initial public offering ("IPO") of the bank's stock fails, the
FDIC must arrange a purchase and assumption transaction or liquidate the new bank within two to five years
of its origination. Id. § 1821(m)(17). New banks must be wound up within two years, but the FDIC has
discretion to extend the life of a bridge bank for three additional one-year periods. Id § 1821 (n)(9).
45. Id.

§ 1821 (c)(5);

FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 39, at 37.

46. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(2)(G)(i)(II), (i)(2).
47. Press Release, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., FDIC Creates Bridge Bank to Take Over Operations of
Silverton Bank, National Association, Atlanta, Georgia (May 1, 2009), availableat http://www.fdic.gov/news
/news/press/2009/pr09061.html.
48. See generally FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supranote 39, at 41-46.
49. Id. at 41.
50. The "disorderly failure" of Lehman was, in part, the motivation for President Obama's proposal for
"the creation of a resolution regime to allow for the orderly resolution of failing" institutions "in situations
where the stability of the financial system is at risk." FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM, supra note 1, at 76;
see also Regulating and Resolving Institutions Considered "Too Big to Fail," supra note 4 (advocating new

regulatory approach for important financial institutions). See generally Nouriel Roubini, Op-Ed., We Need a
New Insolvency Regime for Banks, FORBES.COM, Mar. 26, 2009, http://www.forbes.com/2009/03/25/banks-

nationalization-fdic-bankruptcy-opinions-columnists-insolvency-roubini.html.
51. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(2)(D).
52. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 39, at 69 n.2 ("[T]he FDIC has never been appointed
conservator by the OCC or a state regulatory authority and may decline the appointment if tendered; the FDIC
was appointed conservator once by the Office of Thrift Supervision [in the case of IndyMac].").
53. See generally Damian Paletta et al., IndyMac Reopens, Halls Foreclosureson Its Loans, WALL ST.

J., July 15, 2008, at Cl; Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Failed Bank Information: Information for
IndyMac Bank, F.S.B., and IndyMac Federal Bank, F.S.B., Pasadena, CA, http://www.fdic.gov/bank/indivi
dual/failed/IndyMac.htmi (last visited Nov. 19, 2009).
54. MARK JICKLING, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS: FANNIE MAE AND FREDDIE MAC IN
CONSERVATORSHIP 2-4 (2008), availableat http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/I10097.pdf.
55. Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289, 122 Stat. 2654 (codified as

amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
56. 12 U.S.C. § 4511.
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statute grants the FHFA authority to appoint a conservator after determining that a GSE
is critically undercapitalized.57 Pursuant to this authority, the FHFA appointed itself
conservator of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac on September 7, 2008.8 Having arrogated
all powers possessed by shareholders, directors, and officers, it implemented a plan
under which the Treasury Department will provide up to $100 billion in financing in
exchange for warrants to purchase up to 79.9% of the GSE's common stock (at a price
of $0.00001 per share). 59 The Housing and Economic Recovery Act places no limit on
the length of the conservatorship.60
(5) Open Bank Assistance. The FDIC can inject liquidity into troubled banks if the
transfer will prevent a likely receivership or conservatorship, the transfer will prevent
the bank from breaching capital reserve requirements, and the bank's managers are
competent and have not violated any laws or regulations. 61 This strategy is, of course,
controversial because it protects both creditors and shareholders from the bank's
financial distress.62 A version of open bank assistance was applied to AIG, with the
Federal Reserve injecting $85 billion in return for equity participation notes.63
Strategies along these lines could be among the powers available to a systemic
risk regulator. Instead of minimizing the cost to federal deposit insurance funds, which
is the goal of the FDIC," the regulator would minimize the cost to creditors, financial
markets, and the public from the failure of a systemically important institution.
Affected parties might have a right of appeal, but the regulator would have discretion to
select the appropriate strategy without prior court approval.
3.

Regulatory Framework

Rescue legislation cannot exist in isolation. Because it vests the federal
government-the Treasury, the Fed, or an agency-with enormous discretion, the
legislation must be tied to a broad regulatory framework that limits government
discretion and gives clear guidance to institutions that are subject to potential takeover.
Again, commercial banking law provides a useful analogue. Long before it fails, a
bank is subject to ongoing, prudential regulation by state or federal regulators. 65 This

57. Id. § 4617.
58. See Press Release, Henry M. Paulson, Jr., Sec'y of the Treasury, Statement on Treasury and Federal
Housing Finance Agency Action to Protect Financial Markets and Taxpayers (Sept. 7, 2008), available at
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hpl129.htm
(announcing and detailing reasons for FHFA's
conservatorship of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac).
59. JICKLING, supra note 54, at 3.
60. 12 U.S.C. § 4617; see also Federal Housing Finance Agency, Fact Sheet: Questions and Answers on
Conservatorship, http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/fhfa-consrv faq_090708hpll28.pdf (last visited
Nov. 19, 2009).
61. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(8).
62. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 39, at 47.
63. Matthew Karnitschnig et al., U.S. to Take Over AIG in $85 Billion Bailout; Central Banks Inject
Cash as Credit Dries Up, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17, 2008, at Al.

64. See 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4) (providing that FDIC may exercise authority only at least possible cost to
federal deposit insurance funds, and prescribing methods of determining least costly approach).
65. See generally MACEY ET AL., supra note 34, at 70-73.
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regulation includes capital reserve requirements,66 limits on lending67 and other
investment activities, 68 and periodic reports69 and audits. 70 The relevant state or federal
regulator is charged with the responsibility for initiating any conservatorship or
receivership. 7' Similarly, the GSEs and Federal Home Loan Banks are subject to
regulations governing their capitalization and business practices, and their regulator,
the FHFA, is the decision maker with respect to initiation of any conservatorship or
receivership proceedings. 72
Prudential regulation serves three critical functions. First, it reduces the moral
hazard caused by deposit insurance or any other form of government insurance. 73
Insurance dulls the incentives of the insured parties-the bank and its creditors or
depositors-to monitor and, if necessary, reduce the riskiness of the bank's activities. 74
This moral hazard problem necessitates vigorous monitoring by the insurer. 75 We see
this in the detailed reporting and auditing requirements of bank regulations. 76 Second,
prudential regulation ensures that both the regulator and the public receive timely
information about a commercial bank's condition long before distress occurs.77 When
the FDIC does intervene to rescue a bank, there will be a long paper trail that justifies
the intervention. Finally, prudential regulation cabins FDIC discretion by establishing
objective, often quantifiable, standards for determining whether conservatorship or
receivership is justified.78
Laws governing failing banks, then, have always been tied to a framework
regulating healthy banks. Without a similar framework, rescue legislation would be
deeply troubling because it would give the government wide-ranging, politically
66. See 12 U.S.C. § 1818(a)(8)(A) (empowering FDIC to suspend deposit insurance for institutions
without tangible capital).
67. See id. § 84(a) (prescribing formulas to tie lending limits to collateral).
68. See id. § 24 (restricting equity investments in corporations).
69. See id. § 161 (requiring institutions to provide reports to Comptroller of Currency regarding
condition of institution and payment of dividends).
70. See id. § 1820(d) (mandating annual on-site examinations for all insured institutions).
71. See generally MACEY ET AL., supra note 34, at 725-26 (discussing process of appointing fiduciary to

manage bank's affairs).
72. 12 U.S.C. §§ 4511-4519; see also Federal Housing Finance Agency, About FHFA, http://www.fhfa.
gov/Default.aspx?Page=4 (last visited Oct. 21, 2009) (outlining FHFA's functioning). See supra text
accompanying notes 54-60 for a discussion of the FHFA's establishment and operation.
73. See STUART I. GREENBAUM & ANiJAN V. THAKOR, CONTEMPORARY FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION 443

(2d ed. 2007) (positing that public regulation is necessary to reduce moral hazard).
74. See id. (noting that deposit insurance and other government safeguards intended to protect private
banks ultimately move costs and risks from banks to public and disincentivize banks' self-regulation).
75. See id. at 445 (analogizing moral hazard problem in fire insurance policies to banking industry).
76. See supra notes 65-72 and accompanying text for a discussion of bank regulation requirements.
77. Inadequate information may have contributed to the current crisis. See RICHARD A. POSNER, A
FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF '08 AND THE DESCENT INTO DEPRESSION 145-46 (2009) (stating that

housing bubble started to deflate in 2005, but government did not discover problem in banking industry until
fall 2008).
78. See, e.g., Robert R. Bliss & George G. Kaufman, US. Corporate and Bank Insolvency Regimes: A

Comparison and Evaluation, 2 VA. L. & Bus. REv. 143, 152 (2007) (noting that statutory minimum capital
reserve requirements are designed in part to "reduce] the discretion of bank regulators to decide when to
appoint receivers").
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sensitive discretion in selecting "distressed" institutions for a federal takeover. In the
absence of rules guiding the behavior of regulators and financial institutions,
government decisions will be biased by political pressure. For example, fear of adverse
political or public reaction could delay a much-needed rescue. A timely rescue will
often be one that occurs when an institution has not yet defaulted or entered distress.
The rescue may seem premature to outsiders, even if the agency believes that the
company is in danger of default.79 And there will indeed be a real risk of premature
rescue. Because reasonable minds can disagree whether an institution is "in danger of
default," politics can enter the decision-making process (consciously or
subconsciously).80
Additionally, without a regulatory framework, the relevant federal agency might
have insufficient information to make timely rescue decisions. And, as noted before,
rescue legislation could even increase systemic risk, because it would dampen the
monitoring incentives of creditors, investors, and other private actors.8' Prudential
regulation is needed to address this moral hazard problem.
To be sure, prudential regulation will not eliminate concerns about regulators
abusing their discretion. Even though the FDIC and FHFA operate within a
comprehensive regulatory framework, their rescue decisions are not immune to
criticism. 82 But the goal of legislation is not to remove discretion from federal actorsthat is impossible. The goal is to constrain it in ways that limit ill-informed or biased
decisions. That is possible, but only through legislation that channels the decision
making of systemically important institutions as well as the government actors
empowered to rescue them.
B.

Modifying Chapter 11

The rescue powers of the FDIC-receivership, conservatorship, purchase and
assumption, creation of a bridge bank, etc.-are similar to those of a judge in a Chapter
11 case. Once an institution files for bankruptcy, it enjoys insulation from creditors (the
"automatic stay"). 83 The bankruptcy judge can then approve gradual liquidation (akin
to a receivership)," reorganization (conservatorship),85 or sale of all or part of the

79. See POSNER, supra note 77, at 134-39 (discussing why warning signs were largely ignored and
highlighting difficulty in pacifying public when attempting to prevent "unlikely" events from happening).
80. The response to the current financial crisis has been widely criticized for inconsistency. See Steve
Matthews & Vivien Lou Chen, Hoenig Hits Treasury for Lack of Decisive' Action, BLOOMBERG.COM, Mar. 6,

2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aRFsoblx5kBw (reporting senior Federal
Reserve official's criticism of Treasury's "ad-hoc approach" to bank crisis).
81. See Tyler Cowen, Why Creditors Should Suffer, Too, N.Y. TtMES, Apr. 5, 2009, at BUI

(emphasizing that new proposals effectively protect creditors of big financial firms from "their own lending
and trading mistakes").
82. E.g., Francis X. Diebold & David A. Skeel, Jr., Geithner Is Overreaching on Regulatory Power,

WALL ST. J., Mar. 27, 2009, at All (stating that FDIC did not assume control of lndyMac until after it had
clearly failed).
83. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2006).
84. A firm can file a bankruptcy petition under Chapter 7 liquidation, id. §§ 701-784, or Chapter II
reorganization, id. §§ 1101-1174. Liquidation can be accomplished under either chapter. See generally
DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, THE ELEMENTS OF BANKRUPTCY ch. I (4th ed. 2006). Circuit City, for example,
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institution's assets, together with financing provided by the government or another
lender (purchase and assumption). 86
These features make bankruptcy a potentially attractive mechanism for rescuing
distressed institutions, including systemically important ones.87 One obvious problem is
the safe harbors for financial contracts, discussed in Section II. Financial contracts are
the primary-often the only-assets of financial institutions, and the safe harbors
permit a "run" on these assets.
One solution is to eliminate the safe harbors, at least when a systemically
important institution files for bankruptcy. Some members of Congress, for example,
advocate creation of a new chapter of the Bankruptcy Code for financial institutions.88
Presumably this chapter would closely resemble Chapter 11, but the automatic stay
would apply to all financial contract counterparties in order "to prevent runs on
troubled institutions, thereby helping to alleviate the panic that could strike the
financial system if a large institution finds itself facing difficulties."89 Other details
remain to be worked out. The debtor would probably be limited in its ability to "cherry
pick" or otherwise use the benefit of hindsight to gamble at the expense of financial
contract counterparties. The debtor might also be given strict deadlines for disaffirming
contracts. In this way, bankruptcy judges would be given authority-with respect to
financial contracts-similar to that possessed by the FDIC in commercial bank
insolvencies. 90
Even with these fixes, however, the Bankruptcy Code would remain a poor fit for
systemically important institutions. By the time an institution becomes obviously
distressed, and its managers finally consider a bankruptcy filing, counterparties will
have commenced a "run" on its assets and confidence in the financial system will have
deteriorated. It seems unlikely that troubled institutions will seek bankruptcy protection
before they exhibit signs of distress. The incentive to "gamble for resurrection"-to
underwent liquidation in Chapter 11. See Miguel Bustillo, Retailer Circuit City to Liquidate-ConsumerElectronics PioneerClosing; 34,000 Workers Will Lose Jobs, WALL ST. J., Jan. 17, 2009, at Bl (reporting that

Circuit City liquidated after failing to reorganize under Chapter 11).
85. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174.
86. Sales are often conducted in Chapter 11using § 363(b), which permits sales of assets outside the
ordinary course. See Kenneth M. Ayotte & Edward R. Morrison, CreditorControland Conflict in Chapter 11,

1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 511, 534-36 (2009), available at https://ojs.hup.harvard.edu/index.php/j la/article
/view/57/53 (documenting frequency of "363 sales" in large corporate bankruptcy cases); Douglas G. Baird &
Robert K. Rasmussen, Chapter 11 at Twilight, 56 STAN. L. REv. 673, 691-93 (2003) (same). Chrysler and
General Motors, for example, were recently sold as going concerns, with financing provided by the federal
government. See generally Mark J. Roe & David Skeel, Assessing the Chrysler Bankruptcy, 108 MICH. L. REV.

(forthcoming 2010), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstractid=1426530; Edward R.
Morrison, Chrysler, GM and the Future of Chapter 11 (Columbia Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 365,

2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1529734.
87. See Kenneth Ayotte & David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy or Bailouts?, 35 J. CORP. L. (forthcoming
2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1362639 (discussing features of
bankruptcy law intended to aid financial distress).
88. REPUBLICAN MEMBERS OF THE H. COMM. ON FIN. SERVS., supranote 6, at 3.

89. Id
90. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(8) (2006) (outlining parameters for certain financial contracts). See
generally Robert R. Bliss & George G. Kaufman, A Comparison of US. Corporate and Bank Insolvency

Resolution, ECON. PERSP., 2d Q. 2006, at 44.
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delay bankruptcy as long as possible-will be very strong, particularly because equity
holders generally receive nothing and managers often lose their jobs after a bankruptcy
filing.
To be sure, a distressed institution can be forced into bankruptcy via an
involuntary petition. Under current law, only a group of creditors with unpaid,
unsecured claims can file such a petition.91 That could be changed. Perhaps the federal
government could be given broad authority to file involuntary petitions against
systemically important institutions, regardless of whether it is a creditor. But this power
would be as troubling as proposals for a systemic risk regulator. Would the government
possess sufficient information and proper incentives to file an involuntary petition at
the appropriate time against the appropriate institutions? A broad regulatory framework
would be needed to ensure that this happens. Of course, a bankruptcy judge could
dismiss a premature involuntary bankruptcy petition, but the filing itself conveys
negative information to the market and undermines confidence in the systemically
important institution. 92
A second problem is that the bankruptcy process is managed by a judge. Though
federal regulators are subject to political pressure, they possess expertise that is
generally beyond the ken of judges. When a systemically important institution suffers
distress, rapid decision making is necessary. Federal law permits this kind of speed
when the FDIC seizes a bank.93 Most of the Corporation's decisions, for example, are
not subject to judicial review. Speed is less likely in a bankruptcy case because the
judge must offer due process to objectors. 94 Though the Lehman bankruptcy was
handled very quickly-the North American operations were sold to Barclay's within a
week 95-it seems overly optimistic to expect that every bankruptcy judge would act
with the same dispatch as the judge did in the Lehman bankruptcy case. 96

91. 11 U.S.C. § 303(b) (2006).
92. See Carrick Mollenkamp et al., Lehman Files for Bankruptcy, Merrill Sold, AIG Seeks Cash, WALL

ST. J., Sept. 16, 2008, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SBl22145492097035549.html (describing
negative impact of Lehman's bankruptcy filing on stock market).
93. See supra Section II.A.2 for an analysis of the rescue procedures and strategies available to the
FDIC.
94. See, e.g., II U.S.C. § 1109(b) ("A party in interest ... may raise and may appear and be heard on
any issue ina case under this chapter."); FED. R. BANKR. P. 6004 (as amended by U.S. ORDER 09-16, Mar. 26,
2009) (requiring notice and hearing before courts approve motions to sell assets); S. Motor Co. v. CarterPritchett-Hodges, Inc. (In re MMH Auto. Group), 385 B.R. 347, 372 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2008) (stating that
procedural expediency does not trump due process). See generally Eric S. Richards, Due Process Limitations
on the Modification ofLiens Through Bankruptcy Reorganization, 71 AM. BANKR. L. J. 43, 44-51 (1997).

95. Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc., the parent company, filed its Chapter II petition on September 15,
2008. Bankruptcy Judge Peck approved the sale of Lehman Brothers Inc., a subsidiary, to Barclays on
September 19, 2008. Order Under II U.S.C. §§ 105(a), 363, and 365 and Federal Rules of Bankruptcy
Procedure 2002, 6004 and 6006 Authorizing and Approving (A) the Sale of Purchased Assets Free and Clear
of Liens and Other Interests and (B) Assumption and Assignment of Executory Contracts and Unexpired
Leases, Docket No. 258, In re Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc., No. 08-13555, 2008 WL 4385989 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2008).
96. A third problem is the international scope of most, if not all, major financial institutions. Any rescue
will require extensive coordination with foreign governments, something bankruptcy courts are not well
equipped to handle.
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The deficiencies in the bankruptcy process can be overcome, provided the
government is willing to pay enough. It can intervene before a bankruptcy occurs by
bailing out the troubled institution (as in AIG and Bear Steams). It can also intervene
afterwards by offering financing tied to strict covenants that force a quick
reorganization or liquidation (as in Chrysler and GM).97 These measures are costly, but
the costs impose a salutary brake on overeager regulators, particularly because they
face public scrutiny when they use public funds to bail out failing institutions.
Put differently, little in the current regime prevents the federal government from
conducting quick rescues and pursuing other measures to mitigate a systemic
collapse. 98 The current regime is just more costly for taxpayers when systemically
important institutions fail than one that permits immediate federal takeover. These costs
must be weighed against the costs of a system that permits federal takeovers. That
system requires a massive regulatory apparatus to constrain agency discretion.99
IV. CONCLUSION

Returning to the key question: Is the Bankruptcy Code an adequate mechanism for
resolving the distress of systemically important institutions? No. The government needs
a process with more flexibility and speed than what the Code offers. Although the
government can avoid the Code's constraints by bailing out or extending loans to
failing institutions, the cost to taxpayers is too large.
President Obama has proposed a plausible alternative to the Code. It would vest
the Federal Reserve-working with the Secretary of the Treasury, FDIC, and other
federal regulators-with authority to act as a systemic risk regulator that monitors,
regulates, and rescues any foreign or domestic financial institutionloo whose "material
financial distress . . . could pose a threat to . . . United States financial stability or
the . . . United States economy." 01 The proposed legislation combines close

97. See, e.g., Gen. Motors Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K), at 2 (May 28, 2009), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/40730/000119312509119940/d8k.htm
(describing § 363 sale
proposal); Roe & Skeel, supra note 86, at 12-18 (describing and criticizing § 363 sale of Chrysler); Press
Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Obama Administration Auto Restructuring Initiative Chrysler-Fiat
Alliance (Apr. 30, 2009), http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/tgl15.htm

(delineating Obama administration's

role in Chrysler's restructuring).
98. Almost nothing stops the government from acting to protect markets. Recall that, according to
various government officials, the Fed was powerless to stop Lehman's failure, due to statutory constraints on
its lending abilities. See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text. If true, this suggests that we might want to
expand the Fed's lending powers to include unsecured loans. With greater power, the Fed would be better
poised to prevent a costly bankruptcy filing.
99. The current regime also imposes discipline on financial institutions, which cannot expect
conservatorships or bailouts in the event of distress. They instead face, as Lehman did, the prospect of rapid
liquidation in Chapter 11. This prospect induces troubled institutions (pressured by creditors) to contact federal
regulators and share information before a meltdown.
100. See DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, TITLE Il-CONSOLIDATED SUPERVISION AND REGULATION OF LARGE,
INTERCONNECTED FINANCIAL FIRMs 2-3 (proposed 2009), available at http://www.financialstability.gov/docs
/regulatoryreform/07222009/titlell.pdf [hereinafter TITLE II] (defining "financial company" in various

contexts).
101. Id. at 3; see also DIvIsION D, supra note 1, at 4-6 (proposing procedure for determining whether

financial institution is systemic risk).
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monitoring of institutions before they enter distress1 02 and FDIC-style resolution
procedures 03 when the institution craters. Importantly, it gives the federal government
authority to place institutions into conservatorship or receivership only when their
distress imperils the overall economy. If an institution is "critically undercapitalized"
but its distress does not threaten market stability, the institution will be forced into
bankruptcy instead of receivership or conservatorship." President Obama's proposal,
therefore, invokes alternatives to bankruptcy only when economic conditions
necessitate them. Plus, these alternatives are invoked by the same regulators that
monitor systemically important institutions long before they fail. These features render
the President's plan a viable, targeted approach to protecting financial markets and the
overall economy from a financial institution's failure.
Complicated issues remain, of course. If the FDIC does place an institution in
receivership, some but not all assets and liabilities may be transferred to a stable
purchaser or bridge bank. For example, an investment bank's financial contracts
portfolio-but not its real estate, bonds, and commercial paper-might be transferred
to a bridge bank. The government may believe that market stability is threatened by
quick liquidation of the portfolio, but that quick liquidation of real estate or defaults on
bonds and commercial paper create no systemic risk. In a case like this, how should the
left-behind assets and liabilities-the "rump"-be handled? 105 There will, for example,
be complicated questions about the relative priority of creditors and whether prereceivership payments to creditors or equity holders should be clawed back. Should
these questions be resolved by the FDIC, or should the rump be transferred to a
bankruptcy court for administration? The bankruptcy court will apply well-established
rules; FDIC decision making is more opaque. An investment bank's bonds and

commercial paper may be easier to value-and therefore more liquid-if they are
subject to transparent bankruptcy rules in the event of a receivership. Important issues
such as these must be resolved before systemically important institutions are subject to
a new resolution regime. But these issues are largely details and should not detract
from the broader lesson of the financial crisis: the Bankruptcy Code is not an adequate
mechanism for resolving the distress of systemically important institutions.

102. FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM, supra note 1, at 20.
103. Id. at 76.

104. See TITLE 11, supra note 100, at 32 (describing obligatory bankruptcy for "critically
undercapitalized Tier I financial holding companies").
105. This issue is discussed in Systemic Regulation, Prudential Matters, Resolution Authority and
Securitization: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Financial Servs., 11 Ith Cong. 9-22 (2009) (statement of T.

Timothy Ryan, Jr., President and CEO of the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association),
http://www.house.gov/apps/list/hearing/financialsvcs-dem/ryan_-_sifma.pdf.

